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The image surplus of the 21st-century’ directly maps a crisis of critical new 
ideas, as well a social shift away from confronting economic, environmental 
and political consequences. Today, in the economy of images, exchange 
is the formal determinant of a distracting means of re-production. In an 
age of Snapchat, Instagram and Facebook, photography is a form of both 
abstract labour and enjoyment. While we usually consider photographs to 
be equivalents of a diverse number of things – when they show our faces, 
our sunsets, our favourite food, our pets, our holidays and our celebrations 
– ultimately they fail to maintain this assertion, under even minor scrutiny. 
What if photography contains within it the capacity to be more than a 
representation of some thing or other? Would this not provide a radical 
re-reading of photography and a means to reimagine the structures of 
capital? In other words, to engage with photography as a way of thinking 
allows us to begin to rephrase the discourses of production and exchange.
Following Marx’s formula of commodity-money-commodity I suggest 
there is a process of experience-image-experience, when an experience 
is photographed. I argue that in the digital world we are undergoing an 
inverted shift to image-experience-image. This occurs when the creation 
of images becomes the primary aim and objective. In this new formula, 
image becomes more than image: it is the mediation of experience into 
something incrementally excessive of simply image and becomes a new 
means for a different mode of production.
Hillman John, ‘Surplus-Value: Surplus Image’ (2018) 4(1): 34 
Open Library of Humanities, DOI: https://doi.org/10.16995/
olh.244
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Introduction
In the economy of everyday photographic images, we might consider exchange as 
being the formal determinant of a distracting means of (re)production.1 At a time of 
crisis, regarding challenging economic, environmental and political consequences, 
the obsession with and production of an excess of images appears to express a 
fundamental failure of our vision: signifying a kind of blind spot in our awareness. 
It is as if instead of marshalling challenges to the inequalities that permeate the social 
order, through the act of photographing the world we render things somewhat less 
obdurate.
In the above formulation, photographic images offer a distracting means 
to face an already formed alternative image of the world, not the world itself. 
Photographs are also not only visual images of things structured by a supposed direct 
correspondence with resemblance, they are experienced materially or digitally as 
objects ‘enmeshed with subjective, embodied and sensuous interactions’ (Edwards 
& Hart, 2004: 1). In this sense, photographs are images of things but they also things 
in themselves. Although, even when we understand photographs themselves as 
material objects, there remains a certain tacit acceptance that they are also objects 
that depict images. We understand them as objects that can be looked at, as well 
as objects that contain something which more often than not, demands looking at.
Guy Debord offers a line of thought in The Society of the Spectacle (1994: 38), 
wherein looking is configured as a compensation for the experience of productivity. 
When looking at photographs, the attention given to the visual and the visible 
serves to distract from how photographs emerge from and through particular 
processes of labour: namely those of distribution, duplication and reproduction. 
These processes are the critical components of everyday photographic production. 
Furthermore, following Debord (1994), what appears intrinsic to these processes 
is how an illusion of enjoyment and satisfaction overlaps with the concrete and 
abstract labour required of everyday photographic image production. Inevitably, in 
 1 Following Hand, everyday photographic images are understood as being produced by an image-
making that is now, seemingly, an ‘ordinary aspect of people’s lives’ (Hand, 2012: 3)
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this knotting, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the parts of photography 
we enjoy and the parts that might be described as simply another form of working.
Crucially, everyday images that are miscast as representational objects appear 
to mask something of their own production, of the work they demand of us. In 
other words, we see, experience and understand most photographs as a multitude 
of depictions of things that are happening and going on. But by doing this, we fail 
to engage with the forces of labour and enjoyment that today underpin a different 
function for a photography; a photography that is made every day and pervades 
everywhere. As noted above, even if we accept photography as producing some 
form of object (Barthes, 1984; Edwards & Hart, 2004), it is always confusingly an 
object that carries within it an image. And frustratingly, its materiality is often 
subordinated to something that will ‘fundamentally cohere the photograph as 
image’ (Edwards & Hart, 2004: 15). Thus, analysis of photography as either image 
or material object usually fixates on the ‘act of viewing’ (Edwards & Hart, 2004: 15) 
in some way.
An alternative position offers inroads into photography that does not rely on 
representation as its ground. Instead, photography can be understood as both the 
site of and output from a complex form of cultural production. The almost ceaseless 
rendering of experience as photographic image has served a transition from 
industrial age to information age. Expressing a general move from the materiality 
of objects (the photograph) to the immateriality of experiences (the digital image), 
photography and the digital photographic image has become, as Lister (2007), 
Rubinstein and Sluis (2008) and van Dijk (2011) have argued, intrinsic to ‘globally 
connected flows of information’ (Hand, 2012: 11). In reconfiguring the image of 
modernist modes of production into the phrases of networked and interlinked 
expressions, it appears that we encounter more clearly not a singular moment 
of photography – such as an individual print or a memorable snapshot – but a 
multiplicity of photographically inflected commodities. These all have very different 
forms – material and immaterial – and usually operate in some way at the service of 
pleasure and enjoyment.
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The most obvious manifestations of such photographically orientated 
multiplicities include Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat. Within these 
environments, certain types of photographic images proliferate such as selfies, food 
porn and memes. While these can be explained in part by the ubiquity, mobility 
and connectivity of the smartphone (Murray, 2008; Van Dijk, 2008; Van House, 
2011; Frosh, 2015), they are also indicators of non-representational developments 
(Lasén & Gómez Cruz, 2009; Gómez Cruz & Meyer, 2012; Lister, 2013; Frosh, 2015) 
in thinking about photography.
Non-representational photography and dematerialised 
labour
To many, a non-representational reading of photography would seem counter 
intuitive (Thrift, 2008). However, what this offers is a way to consider the 
structure of photographic production and consumption, in a contemporary 
context, without resorting to the traditional approach of visual descriptions and 
analysis. What framework links the phenomena of photographic multiplicities, 
and what understanding can be brought to the vast and increasing production 
of photographic images? I argue digital photography now represents a form of 
symbolic dematerialised labour common to late capitalism. It may even be possible 
to suggest it is the most significant form of labour in the developed world in 
this period. Situated and circulated most obviously within the horizontal social 
networks of the internet and emerging through advances in associated technology, 
photography embodies something of how Marx described the general intellect. 
This is to understand photography as the ‘power of knowledge objectified’ (Marx, 
1973: 638) and as a very real and pervasive force of production. Of course, such 
production requires human labour, but it also emerges autonomously with its 
own agency. Thus, it embodies subjective and algorithmic properties (Rubinstein & 
Sluis, 2008; Uricchio, 2011; Van Dijk, 2011; Gómez Cruz & Meyer 2012).
Marx suggests a determining factor of how capital functions comes from the 
agencies labour sets in motion, not directly through labour time. (Marx, 1973: 636). 
In these terms, labour is not something embedded within production. Instead, it 
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functions as ‘watchman and regulator’ (Marx, 1973: 637). I argue the automatic, 
almost autonomous, creation of often interchangeable digital photographic images–
linked by the interactions of users is one example of how photography redefines 
contemporary forces of production and social relations. Furthermore, the freed up 
labour time produced by the apparent automation of image making processes creates 
a space and capacity to impulsively make more and more images (Flusser, 2007; 
Uricchio, 2011; Gómez Cruz & Meyer, 2012). Through these reconfigured notions 
of production, I claim photography anticipates a new subjectivity. It does not do 
this by showing different pictures of things, but by how it organises and distributes 
information and by how this is then responded to.
My central argument is that Marx’s notion of ‘surplus’, and specifically 
that of surplus-value, helps provide a way to understand the abundance of 
images we experience today (Marx, 1991). It allows us to treat photographs 
non-representationally and to examine their agency as being structured by their 
form of production. There is then, within my argument, a search for the apparent 
structural homology between surplus-value and the surplus images we currently 
experience.
Surplus-value and a new economy
Marx identified that there was a need for surplus-value within the process of 
production in order for capitalism to continue. He claimed that a surplus is 
revealed under conditions where there is no equality or balance between what 
a commodity costs to produce and what this commodity is then traded for. A 
surplus is formed when the costs of production are lower than the ultimate cost 
of exchange. Importantly, without creating a surplus capitalism will cease to 
function. Therefore, surplus is understood as one of the drivers of capital. I suggest 
this notion of surplus, and its relation to production and exchange, is reflected in 
how photographic images are currently made. Today, most photographs are made 
in anticipation of being shared, liked and valued. These kinds of interactions, or 
perhaps a more appropriate term would be transactions, help to boost reputations, 
relations and status. In short, they create a specific rendering of subjectivity.
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In Capital, Marx described how use-value is present in the production of things. 
When things have a use there is a value attached to such usage. He also suggested 
it is perfectly possible for commodities to have both a use-value and a separate 
value. When a commodity is exchanged for the cost of its production, there is no 
creation of surplus-value; it is simply exchanged for the value of its production. 
The consequence of this kind of exchange is that money is not then converted into 
capital. Therefore, as I stated earlier, for capital to function there always needs to 
be surplus-value, which is realized within the commodity at the point of exchange. 
The process of creating surplus-value is generally understood as being simply a 
continuation of the production of value. Surplus-value is something extra added to 
a commodity and realized later when it is exchanged. It is not the overpricing of a 
commodity, nor is it a result of the consumer paying too much. It is determined at 
the point of production and, for Marx, was directly connected to the excess amount 
of the worker’s labour used to produce capital.
In relation to how value is produced, for photography there are two possible 
positions to consider. Firstly, if photographs are understood as being commodities 
that are traded for money (for example in the art market or in the commercial 
sector), then like all commodities within capital, the laws of surplus-value should 
apply. For photography, the value of a photograph may well be connected directly 
to something other than the actual physical photograph or its production costs. 
For example, when what the image shows, i.e. its content, has some form of 
marketable value, this will be transferred to the photograph itself. Photographs of 
celebrities, depending on their current popularity, will likely command different 
prices. In this case, value is then ‘reflexively determined’ (Marx qtd in Žižek, 1989: 
20; Žižek, 2006: 106).
Clearly not all photographs enter into or become part of the system of monetary 
exchange. Therefore, a second position considers how the everyday photographic 
images we produce are not often or usually exchanged for money. Instead, they are 
part of a new economy of interaction and information exchange; one that converts 
a status update, a like or a comment into a new and different form of surplus-
value. In this sense I claim photographic images are intrinsic to dematerialised 
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labour, not at the point of their production, which may well be understood through 
a more traditional reading of the concrete labour process, but at a further stage; a 
stage when they are abstractly, distributed and shared. For surplus-value to operate 
within photography an additional process is embedded into the overall production 
of images, which is presupposed during the concrete labour-power of production. 
This is how photographs correspond directly to new forms of knowledge and 
information exchange, not to the traditional processes of manufacturing and selling. 
Such a correspondence is also connected to how abstract labour is embedded into 
photography. Here, photographic labour can be understood as something of a social 
imperative, a task that must be completed in order to sustain both an experience 
and photography itself.
Today, the circulation of photography is dispersed and distributed, and its 
method embodies duplication and repetition. These processes contribute to the 
ways images can be experienced as commodities in another form. However, our 
contemporary experience of photographic images is not like our consumption of 
food or other material commodities. Instead, photographic images are experienced 
in a similar fashion to how we encounter an environment (Burgin, 2009). They 
operate through time and movement, through associations and connections. They 
are a connected multiplicity, linking to the familiar and signaling the register 
of repetitions and duplications. They are descriptive not because they show the 
recognizable shapes of objects, but in how their form latently describes and 
expresses the terms of production in a new economy of information exchange. In 
late capitalism, this form of production takes a position that dominates, influences 
and colours all others (Marx, 1973).
The limits of representation
By approaching photography as a form of production and distribution, another 
perspective emerges from which we can understand photographs. This is one 
that situates photographs at the discursive limits of representation and means 
photography is actualized by its own failure to represent. Despite appearing to 
have the potential to impartially and mechanically record the world, photography 
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consistently fails to do so. It is this negation of truly successful representation 
that sustains and defines photography. By understanding photography in this way 
the fundamental but usually hidden excesses of photographic images become 
apparent. If photography fails to represent, representation itself must be one 
of its central questions. However, it is not a question that should be framed in 
terms of how photographic likeness or similarity operates. Instead, it should set 
out to challenge how representation itself is structured through a configuration 
of processes and systems, of flows of information. This means we experience 
photographs not only as visual pictures but also as units of data, as expressions of 
rhythms or as interconnected patterns.
In this sense, once we stop reflecting on photography as only making 
representations of things, photographs can be seen as the expression of a new 
economy. This is because, when they are seen as depictions of things in the 
world, the force photographs have in structuring the world becomes less and 
less obvious. It becomes hidden behind thoughts and ideas about meaning and 
intention, which appear to be embedded into images. This distraction happens at 
the point when we ignore the formal nature of the photograph and focus exclusively 
on its content. In doing this, suddenly the photograph itself disappears. We are left 
with a somewhat imperfect mimetic, an image of some thing or other. However, 
photography approached via this non-representational position becomes a more 
dynamic and an even more interesting object to think through conceptually. To be 
clear, I make no claim that the visual image is no longer important. Photographs 
continue to show things. Fundamentally, my argument offers a way to challenge the 
dominance of the visual.
Of course, a problem for photography is that it has always been 
overdetermined. Its ontology is, historically, problematic. There can be little doubt 
it operates within symbolic and imaginary domains, but a symbolic and imaginary 
understanding of photography never fully accounts for what photography does 
or how it functions. The apparent static nature of representational objects and 
their emphasis on the visual has the effect of making photography appear to be 
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fixed, even though cultural contexts and meanings alter what photographs show 
us. Fundamentally, photography appears unchanged and unchallenged. But with 
a non-representational approach to its study, photography can become more 
experiential. This helps explicitly expose its properties as part of a continual 
process; the incessant production of images. It is this in motion nature of 
photography that directly relates back to Marx’s own use of the dialectical method, 
whereby capital exists and is described as a process and not a static thing (Harvey, 
2010: 12).
A non-representational approach allows photography to be theorized 
differently. It helps frame questions that ask why and how photographs exist 
rather than ones that interrogate what photographs depict. Historically, 
photography has tended to be particularised by its subject matter. This resulted in 
defining what a photographic image is by examining and attempting to explain it 
by what it shows. As stated earlier, even theoretical approaches to the materiality 
of photographs (see Edwards & Hart, 2004) retain a certain sense or relation to the 
visual. But I claim this is a false unification. The extensive examination of the visual 
content of photographs, or even the relationship of object to image, consistently 
fails to reveal core aspects to what photography is or does. If we were to cut up the 
human body, we would not find anything that equates to the human subject; in a 
similar way, looking more deeply into visual appearances does not reveal very much 
about photography.
Certainly, when examined in terms of production, exchange, movement 
and circulation, photography appears to be constitutive of a very different multi-
agential force. Thus, what photographic images do and what value they have extends 
beyond being an expression of the categories used to define what they show. An 
example of this can be seen in how photographs of a specific subject matter can 
elicit a global response and reaction. However, this is not because an image depicts a 
scene realistically according to prevailing conventions. In this context one might cite, 
amongst many possible examples, the torture images that emerged from Abu Ghraib 
prison or the images of Syrian child Alan Kurdi, whose body was found washed up 
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on a Turkish beach. The standard response is to consider images such as these as 
documentary evidence of an event, or to view them as a reliable and concise visual 
summary of what happened. Against this view, I argue these photographs offer 
something more, a hidden surplus-value. It is this surplus that offers the possibility 
of exposing something of representation; something hidden from our conventional 
understanding of a photograph and of photography.
Photographic excess
In the above examples, I suggest their surplus should be understood as how they 
are more than photographs. This means there is something which exceeds their 
being as simply photographic images of things or events. Of course, the logic of 
the signifier and the symbolic order is embedded into a representational reading 
of photographs. I would, however, suggest there is an excess in how these kinds 
of images relate to an infinite temporality. Their meaning is conveyed as much 
by how they proliferate, how they duplicate and how they disseminate as it is by 
what they depict. In fact, their pervasiveness can result in them becoming almost 
invisible. We might speak about them as powerful images, which have an effect at a 
specific time, but their force is linked to such things as the number of people who 
have seen or reacted to them rather than what they portray. Today, photographs 
are infinitely situated across a network of screens and devices, making them 
distinctively different from how photographs have been previously materialised.
A constitutive part of the conditions of production is how the photographic 
image contributes toward a transformation of late capitalist subjectivity. This is not 
to say the photograph records the transformation, but to state that a photograph 
embodies the transformation.
Of course, there are many lines of argument that could assess, critique or 
contextualise the images from Abu Ghraib. We might, for example, politically 
question the circumstances depicted. We might also question the desire to 
photograph the conditions depicted at all. What these images show are not 
circumstances that are hidden from society, rather they explicitly show what we 
know happens but that we do not wish to have confirmed actually takes place. When 
such images are widely shared, distributed and discussed what is traumatic is how 
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the usually unseen has become seen. A further component of our distress is the 
realisation that such depictions have apparently escaped containment, through an 
act of sharing, such that they are rampantly embedding themselves into our everyday 
perception.
Algorithmic photography and contemporary experience
Algorithmic processes, which govern how photographic images are distributed, 
contribute to the structuring of contemporary perception. Algorithms order, 
organise and distribute data into different media across a virtual environment. They 
channel data into image and amalgamate interactions, tags, likes, comments and 
retweets. This process pays little or no attention to what images show. Instead, it 
functions recursively, accumulating and aggregating data. It also embeds itself back 
into the data. And in this way, we gain access to the most popular, the most liked, the 
most retweeted forms. Most troubling is that these often appear to be empirically 
and naturally selected.
How photographic images are exchanged and shared is intrinsic to a new 
information economy: an economy that trades with experiences rather than 
material commodities and is determined by abstract labour forces rather than 
concrete ones. For clarity, I understand photography as being part of a process 
responsible for the transformation of a range of different experiences. I make 
deliberate use of the word experience rather than the philosophical term event 
(Badiou, 2005; Žižek, 2014), because events are recognized reflexively in their 
opening up of truth (Badiou, 2005: xii). This means we cannot at any specific 
moment observe or photograph the event. Events are something we can only 
understand as happening after they have occurred. For Badiou, an event is a rupture 
in the perceived continuity of order; it is my argument that one of the possible 
instruments of making such a rupture is photography itself. But photography does 
not observe the event in the present. The event happens later, after photography 
(again we can easily understand the Abu Ghraib images in these terms).
In keeping with my non-representational approach and my use of the notion of 
surplus, I claim photography transforms experience into event. This is done not only 
through what it depicts to us visually, but by adding some form of excess or surplus 
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to experience. It does this is through the processes of production and distribution, 
how photographs are made and then shared. These processes provide continuity 
between labour and pleasure. Photography appears to perfectly combine these, so 
there appears to be little or no division between them. In the connected world of 
the Internet we do not value experiences by what we recall of them; we value them 
through consideration and anticipation of how much effort is taken to record them 
and the subsequent impact of sharing them. Such anticipation is manifested in the 
choreography of life for the camera, the most obvious form being the ‘gesture’ of the 
selfie image (Frosh, 2015).
It appears the structuring of experience through photography does not ever 
deliver a form of truth. Instead, it brings into being a means to gauge and throttle a 
particular value. In the crudest terms, we can measure something of an experience’s 
value directly through photography and its interactions. It follows that within a 
society dominated by images, photography is a socially necessary or useful activity, 
which transforms experiences. This then returns us to the question, what actually 
creates this insatiable demand for photographic images?
The distracting rhythm of photography
As with Marx’s analysis of commodity exchange where the creation of need is 
critical, a new demand for images has come from websites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, Snapchat and the internet in general. But in meeting this demand 
photography continues, more intensely, to obscure the collective relations and 
forces of labour and work behind a veneer of individual creativity and enjoyment. 
One of the results of this obfuscation is, as I have indicated, a new late capitalist 
subjectivity. This subjectivity emerges at a point where work and enjoyment appear 
to coincide (Žižek, 2016: 488). This new subjectivity is located within a society 
transitioning from the prohibition of enjoyment to one which now demands it 
(McGowan, 2014; Ahmed, 2010). Against this general backdrop of a life without 
boredom or restriction, labour and enjoyment now appear imperceptibly joined 
together. What emerges is a complex, non-binary and fundamentally uncertain 
subject who seeks out different forms of release. In order to escape from depression 
and ‘nervous hyperactivity’ (Žižek, 2016), this subject becomes attracted to the 
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mundane. This often takes the form of watching YouTube videos, which show 
people doing everyday things such as unboxing products or chores like cleaning 
their cars (Žižek, 2016). Perhaps the over-production of repetitive, duplicate images 
experienced as a ubiquitous and everywhere photography functions in a similar 
way; distracting from the otherwise ‘frantic daily rhythms’ (Ibid) of late capitalist 
social relations. What this indicates is a reality shaped not only from representation 
but also from numerous and distracting processes. This move signals a different 
intentionality for photography, away from being a recorder of things and towards 
becoming a distraction, a process or a rhythm in itself. It should not be approached 
as a discrete object of study, but as a process of relational forces that operates not 
unlike the way Marx described the function of capital. However, this still does not 
fully explain the apparent need and desire to take so many photographs.
In Mette Sandbye’s article ‘It has not been – it is: the signaletic transformation 
of photography’, photography is described as ‘process, presence, and bodily “affect”’ 
(Sandbye, 2016: 105). Presence and being present are understood as different 
modes, which are then photographically mediated. Taking photographs and 
immediately sharing them is part of a presence/present mode of photography. What 
this brings forth is an interpellation of a different type of photographic subjectivity. 
A rudimentary example of this is when swiping through images on a mobile device. 
Through this very process we become activated and entwined in photography’s 
relational structure. Our demand for there to be another image after every swipe 
creates two imbricated cycles. In one cycle an infinite amount of photographic 
images supplies our demands; in the other we swipe continuously in order to satisfy 
a curious and unending desire. Clearly, there are other complex processes at work 
here (for example, the interactions of databases, the algorithms of selection and the 
interactions of other users), but an unfulfilled and infinite desire shapes the structure 
of photography as it is experienced today.
In thinking about photography anew we should take account of how it 
embodies a form of production; about how it is deployed through certain 
technologies; and how, within its processes of distribution, it creates new forms 
of social relations. It would be wrong to simply assume that the visual component 
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of a photograph is directly responsible for these. In fact, the visual in photography 
is really a fixed point and a distracting one. At a basic level of interpretation, 
photographic appearances do not address the appearance of something. What 
they indicate is that there may be something else behind the appearance. The 
dynamic relations and rhythms of photography, the extent of its possibilities as a 
form, require a more penetrating perspective. This should take into account the 
changing relationship between productive forces, technology and social relations, 
because these help to shape subjectivity and society in new ways.
The rendering of desire
At this point, I wish to return and consider briefly an alternative critique of 
photography’s representational aspects. The visual surface of photographs inevitably 
appears to embody a lost object (Barthes, 1984). Through a failure to realise and to 
replace what is not there, we then continue to move from photograph to photograph. 
In this way, we confront on one failure after another; one image after another. 
This simply returns us to a function of representations. However, one of the most 
important questions for photography is not what it represents but the form of how 
it represents. This question of how is less embedded into representation and more 
firmly rooted into production. The fantasy of being able to represent something that 
will almost certainly become lost is fundamental to the spread, popularity and wider 
interest in photography and photographs. This false promise of the photograph is 
essentially that it will somehow provide an object of satisfaction, or a replacement 
of the lost object. Photography renders both a desire and a false fulfilment that 
carries on infinitely, driven by the disappointment embedded within it. The infinite 
photograph is probably best articulated in any Google image search, wherein what 
is returned are pages and pages of more and more images. But it is image itself 
that constitutes the gap between objective reality and the symbolic order. Therefore, 
what unites all photographs is a failure to adequately represent, while desire drives a 
need to address such a failure.
Desire, as it is manifested within capitalism, is organised in order to create 
subjects who will try to understand the problem of desire itself. In photography the 
drive to image occurs because subjects appear to want or desire to be photographed. 
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However, this process is not some natural desire contained within the subject, 
but a projected desire onto a subject perceived to require photography. There is 
no object out there waiting and wanting to be photographed: instead there is a 
photographic desire that substantiates the world. Perhaps, we come close, in this 
sense, to viewing all the world as being in some way photographic. However, what 
is significant is how photography and the structure of capitalistic desire merge. 
It is of no small coincidence that terms we can apply to photography – such as 
authenticity, fantasy or satisfaction – are also terms that readily apply to capitalism. 
Additionally, if what drives capitalism is the accumulation of capital, then money 
becomes the reason and expression of capitalist success. This reconfigures the 
commodity–money–commodity formula into that of money–commodity–money, 
thereby money becomes a means in and for itself. Could a parallel be drawn to 
illuminate what is currently driving the volume of photographic images we 
produce, such that we now experience an accumulation of image for image?
As photography is unable to absolutely resolve searching for something, its 
failure necessitates a form of re-invested additional action. This is where image, 
like capital accumulation, becomes something in and for itself and we experience 
image for image. A responsive photographic behaviour is produced, which requires 
acting as if photography can at some point fulfil what is lacking. In this sense, 
photographic actors, with their repetitive actions – photographing their food, 
themselves or their cats – are inscribed into a normal process of behaviour. All the 
while, the next image, and if not that one then the next one, promises to deliver 
some form of unmediated experience. This very possibility of image-qua-image 
happens only when social relations (most obviously exemplified by a digital network 
of interconnected images) are determined in a particular way. This suggests, as 
I have been arguing, that photography is not a disconnected object that should 
be interrogated or examined in isolation and only for what it shows us. Rather, 
photography is a propagating, distributing and self-replicating process, which is 
simultaneously both visual and non-visual, material and non-material. Not only 
does it show us a visual version of the world, it also configures certain responses and 
behaviours within the world. As I have stated, paying attention to the visual acts as 
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an obstacle to realising other engagements with what photography does. Thus, I 
claim, considering photography as a multidimensional object of study opens up an 
experiential way of thinking about the world, not just a visual one. However, it does 
not open up the world of appearances – reality – to anything other than a mediated 
and potentially superficial experience.
What is crucial is the very appearance of some form of accessibility. It is 
essential for photography that, to an extent, reality appears to be understandable 
and reachable. The real frustration is that it is not. It is apparent that today the 
terms of this frustration are often ignored. Improvements in imaging technology 
are one example whereby a claim is made to be able to produce more realistic 
images. Furthermore, I suggest the absence of being able to really experience 
reality animates a kind of drive to photograph it. As Freud argued in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (2015), the human subject is defined through a constitutive loss. 
Photography, like the Freudian subject, is determined by a satisfaction that comes 
from repeating this loss, by the reiteration of one failure after another. I argue 
the potential, and ultimate realisation, of that failure that drives photographic 
representational practice. The success of photography therefore becomes 
dependent upon its ability to fail to adequately represent. In this way, I claim 
photography is situated at the very limits or, potentially, even beyond the limits of 
representation. It satisfies our desire for images by how it constitutes itself as the 
obstacle of its own efforts. In other words, the only satisfaction it actually achieves 
is ultimately created by the continual repeating of the failure of representation. 
What is important is not the final outcomes – the photographs themselves – but 
the means by which such outcomes are not achieved; in this journey failure is 
written into the process. This is, of course, also the structure of desire for the 
commodity in capital.
The surplus of experienced reality
Another critique of a photograph’s visual surface can be offered if we consider 
the limits of its representational properties. I suggest we can learn something 
of photographic ontology through its point of failure. A printed black and white 
photograph might be understood as more than shades of tone printed onto paper. 
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It signifies something by its interaction with light and shade and the shapes it 
reveals. Usually, we might claim an image is a photograph because it has a set of 
properties: it freezes time and portrays objects, people or places (Wells, 2010: 1). 
It is also possible to invert this and state any images with these functions do this 
because they are photographs. This is the function of the photographic. However, 
what happens if photographs can only be determined to be photographs because 
they are not the reality they depict? Understood in this way, photography forces a 
minimal distance from reality and also from representation. The photographic is 
then a surplus of experienced reality because it is neither reality nor an adequate 
representation of reality.
Photographs may be, at some level, appear structurally limited by the symbolic. 
Although, they become seemingly unlimited when they are placed within a 
horizontal network, as experienced by the Internet. In the network, images hide 
their symbolic determination through their overuse – in the guise of the repetitions 
of sunsets, selfies and Selena Gomez (the image of Selena Gomez was rated as the 
most popular Instagram image of all time in 2016 (The Huffington Post, 2016) – 
such that representation becomes the only thing we think we are experiencing. 
Simultaneously, the returning kernel of the real blinds us to its own reappearance 
and maintains its own distance from any symbolic equivalence. Therefore, we 
cannot know photographs are real representations. Instead they are real, and they 
are representational independently. I argue endless streams of photographs are a 
universal response to an impossible and radical unknowability of experienced 
reality. As a consequence of there being an abundance of photographic images, our 
perception becomes photographic in its form. Any attempt at unmasking reality is a 
false goal: we cannot look behind photographic images to find reality. The process of 
examining what lies behind the manifest content of the symbolic moves toward the 
unknowable, or even the unthinkable. Instead of pursuing this, it is best (and here 
I borrow from Freud) to consider the question as to why the symbolic exists in the 
form it does.
Fundamental to a Lacanian understanding of signification is the notion of the 
gap, a divide between signifier and signified. The gap is what structures the signifier 
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and signified. As photographs show us things that are ostensibly no longer there, 
in some capacity they appear to occupy or fill in the gap. In this way the world 
is perceived as somehow incomplete through a sense of presence and absence. In 
capitalism the commodity is seen as the means to bridge such incompleteness. 
Although commodities are in some way present to us, they nevertheless still 
ultimately fail to eliminate subjective absence completely. While capitalism is 
structured differently from signification, it nonetheless presents the very same 
failings as an absence of presence. Absence is inserted into the subject, through the 
failure of signification to deliver on its promise of providing access to the signified. 
The world is then mediated through an impossibility of resolving absence with 
presence.
Conclusion
If photography operates at an intersection of two forces – of labour and 
enjoyment – undefined by either one or the other, oscillating between them, how 
might we understand these? On a representational level, a surplus escapes the 
photographic image. This ultimately results in a sense of lack and the desire to repeat 
the search for what has escaped. As I have outlined above, in representational terms, I 
suggest that what is excess or surplus in the image is the very nature of photography 
itself. Here we might say that there is something especially photographic about 
photographs. This, as I have claimed, is the fundamental failure to adequately 
represent. It is at the non-representational level where surplus-value emerges 
through the concrete and abstract processes of production, duplication and 
repetition. As with surplus-value in the commodity, which is created at the point 
of production, the processes of the network–duplication, sharing and interaction–
are already presupposed within everyday photographs. Shown in their ability to 
infinitely replicate, everyday photographic images become the casual apparatus 
of everyday representation. This form of representation is now routinely produced 
and circulated. The very logic of photographic production and duplication explicitly 
maps the ways that both early and late capitalist production functions. In its 
mechanical reproductive mode, photography is the production line of images, the 
idealised form of modernist image making. In late capitalism, photography again 
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shares the properties of production by the circulation of abstracted emotional values. 
Photographs are not embodied as the prosthetics of memory; they are statements 
and enunciations of a differently speaking subject. With their infinite supply, and 
their continuous distorting and ameliorating, they resist static interpretations and 
appear to gain plasticity. How they reform, reproduce and proliferate is governed and 
shaped by users, objects, relational databases, software commands and algorithmic 
processes. These do not rely exclusively on what we visually see, only on how we 
respond or interact.
There is, of course, an argument that would rightly find something paradoxical 
in taking away from photography its representational function. What are 
photographs if they are not in some way images of something? However, the extent 
to which we are embedded into the production, distribution and consumption 
of photography is what forms the basis of a changed and new late capitalist 
subjectivity. It is this aspect of photography that is largely under theorised. It would 
be reasonable to suggest that the relationship we have with everyday photographic 
images is constitutive of a shift in wider social-relations. As with Marx’s concern 
over the conditions of industrial factories and their machines, which produced 
commodities, the digitalisation of life also requires new attention. There are no 
actual factories producing everyday photographic images, because their production 
is dispersed amongst the population. As I have indicated, these photographic 
workers are engaged in the overlapping modes of enjoyment and labour. In terms 
of distribution and consumption, the points of contact and interaction with 
photographic images are often via the horizontal network of the Internet and 
the screen. This general shift, from out of the factory into the abstract spaces of 
the digital, must necessarily have an impact on class, gender and family relations. 
And it will also create changes to the intricate mechanisms of daily life. Of course, 
photography is not alone in being responsible for this. However, it is one of the 
most significant forms of the digital. Photography is also one of the determining 
mediums that interfaces the world, it is therefore useful as an instrument to 
help explain the new conditions it helps provoke. In its most basic formulation, 
much everyday photography masks an antagonism to itself. In that – despite its 
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visual content appearing to have the potential to be ordinary, random and even 
disposable – it is most usually highly structured, organised and systematically 
reproduced. This has the effect of creating a certain indifference, over familiarity and 
passivity. What photographs depict visually is in abundance; there is always another 
version of the same image. However, what these images also do is contribute to 
the curation of our own lives. They become part of the commodity story of the late 
capitalist subject and advance an opaque mediation of the self as both a subject 
and object. This process is not only reliant on what is shown visually, it also needs 
substantial interactions; it requires the social relations of the network to sustain 
and maintain it. The currency or value generated relies not so much on content, but 
more on the responses that can be elicited from humans and computer processes. 
What is critical is not what we are showing each other, but the fact that someone 
somewhere is looking and interacting.
Perhaps then, one final paradox to this need for looking and interacting is 
that today large numbers of digital photographs are taken but never looked at. 
These digital files are downloaded from cameras and stored on hard drives but 
then never opened. They remain forever as code, as data objects: never to be 
materialised by software into anything resembling the visual. In this way, they fail 
to exert the forces associated with the representation of reality. Images in code 
form have no sense of composition, no logic of framing or of depth of field or any 
other elements associated with photography. Their surfaces cannot be read: they 
are neither a window onto the world nor a mirror held up to the world. Instead, 
these unrealised digital images express another potentiality. They are quite literally 
a part of photography’s surplus and inevitably within them labour and enjoyment 
are elided. I argue, the shift they indicate is part of the wider move from making, 
manufacturing, buying and selling – the activities of mercantile capitalism – to the 
liking, scrolling, swiping and status updates of late capitalist subjectivity. We are 
no longer engaged in labour to produce things in the traditional sense, instead we 
work to show our enjoyment, to indicate our mood and to declare our interests. 
These unseen digital files are only one aspect of this process. Yet, they are the 
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crudest form of de-materialised image, which then require databases, algorithms 
and software to actualise them.
The de-materialised digital image is an abstraction from photography, and 
while all images are at some point de-materialised, these leftover images are 
especially indicative of the underlying structures of digital photography. In this 
state they point directly toward photography’s own conditions of production and 
thereby pose a threat to photography’s representational paradigm (Rubinstein & 
Sluis, 2013: 25). They are also an expression of surplus-labour and enjoyment left as 
an unrealised, but ultimately passive force.
We should consider what value these images have when they are made and kept 
but ultimately remain in the form of data. Žižek offers one possible answer when 
he uses the term ‘interpassivity’ (2008: 144) as the other side of interactivity. In this 
state, the object takes away any subjective reaction. When images are kept with a 
possibility of being viewed later, the awareness that they are kept provides a kind of 
satisfaction. The computer is understood as looking at the images on our behalf. Here, 
I have modified and updated Žižek’s argument from The Plague of Fantasies (2008: 
145), where he suggests films recorded on a VCR are stored for viewing. The VCR in 
a way watches the movies in place of them being watched in reality. The VCR is the 
‘big Other,’ of symbolic registration (Žižek, 2008: 145). Žižek develops interpassivity 
as a form of enjoying through the other. However, it is equally indicative of the 
overwhelming mediation of experience. This over-saturation of representations 
means we can only respond to them by a further proxy. This means we are ultimately 
forced to distance ourselves, because we cannot be confronted by the scale of the 
task of having a direct response to each one.
Implicit in this is how excess images diminish all image value by an inherent 
over supply. There are, quite simply, more images than we have time to look at. There 
is a photographic gridlock. But there is another possible conclusion; these images 
are also the effect of a voracious desire to photograph and share our day-to-day 
experiences. In these vast quantities, they can be considered as the residues of a late-
capitalist discourse, which motivates a subject who passes over and interacts with 
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so many information flows but may be barely conscious of its detail. In this analysis, 
the volume of image data represents new modes of being and behaviour. In a similar 
fashion the likes an image attracts, the Tinder matches achieved and the re-tweets 
that propagate the Internet are all an accumulation of different kinds of data 
interactions and a manifestation of surplus-value. They are not a goal in themselves; 
they are part of an ever-expanding self-reproductive process, which shapes responses 
and behaviours. The significance for subjectivity is how it moves from image itself 
to abstracted behaviours and processes. In the extreme, it no longer matters what 
we see, intuit or interact with, only that we do so directly or via a proxy. In this we 
realise the surplus-value presupposed at the point of production. This also creates 
a shift from the binds of representation and sets up questions as to the veracity of 
subjectivity and experience. It is within representation that the subject was and is 
established as a ‘rational being capable of objectifying the world’, and the knowable 
world is limited only to a form of rational representation (Rubinstein & Sluis, 2013: 
26). Non-representational thinking provides new states of being not defined by the 
binary of image and object. The current period of abstract production is obfuscated 
by a labour process mediated by enjoyment and pleasure. The unceasing demand to 
make and consume everyday photographic images appears to satisfy a very different 
human need – not the need to remember, recall, record or document – the need to 
express our failure at, and frustration with, not being able to express anything at 
all. Instead, the unknowable world becomes an unlimited and interminable flow of 
surplus image, image, image.
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